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Abstract
This paper uses the multinomial choice model to analyze the individuals' choice of banks
based on their characteristics and the type of banking services used. The study is based on
survey data gathered after the 2001 crisis in Turkey, of which one major component was bank
failures. The ¯ndings indicate that age, education, and culture play an important role in the
choice of public banks versus private banks. Occupation, receipts of salary/pension payments,
closeness of branches, branch density, friendly sta® are other factors in°uencing the choice.
Deposit rates do not seem to be much important overall, yet they are still e®ective in choosing
small private banks. Small private banks are less likely to be chosen on the basis of trust,
indicating the customers of such banks choose on the basis of high interest rates only.
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11 Introduction
Turkey has experienced a few ¯nancial crises since the 1980s when the ¯nancial liberalization
started. Although liberalization was underway, a sound ¯nancial system was never in place until
after the 2001 crisis when severe measures were taken to regulate the ¯nancial sector.
The recent history of the banking sector in Turkey since the 1980s is therefore characterized
by bad banking practices and bank failures. Especially after the initial liberalization attempts, as
the regulations on deposit rates were lifted, banks started to compete on the basis of high interest
rates. Many small size banks were established, which pushed the interest rates higher. In addition,
the banking practice, especially in the 1990s, have become to borrow from abroad and to invest in
government securities, and in turn to create a currency mismatch. All these led to bank failures.
However, in the meantime, people still chose those banks that had potential risks, partly thanks to
full deposit insurance which was in e®ect prior to 2001.
The aim of this study is to analyze the factors that contribute to the choice of banks by people.
For this purpose, a unique data set is used, which is gathered after the 2001 crisis in Turkey. The
analysis builds up on a multinomial choice model where the dependent variable is the choice of
banks and the explanatory variables include consumer characteristics as well as banking services.
The ¯ndings indicate that demographic factors play an important role in the bank choice as well
as receiving salary/pension payments from a particular bank, closeness of branches, branch density,
bank having friendly sta®. Deposit rates do not seem to be much important overall, yet they are
still e®ective in choosing small private banks. Small private banks are less likely to be chosen on
the basis of trust, indicating the customers of such banks choose on the basis of high interest rates
only. This supports the idea that full deposit insurance distorts the incentives by causing small
banks to o®er very high interest rates for competition while making customers choose banks based
on interest rates rather than riskiness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related literature is reviewed in Section 2. Section
3 provides an overview of the Turkish banking sector. Section 4 introduces and discusses the data
set used. Econometric framework and estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
22 Literature
Although the literature on the supply side of the banking industry, i.e. how the sector should
be regulated, the structure of the market, costs, etc. is vast, there is not much literature on the
demand side, i.e. how consumers make their decisions on bank choice.
Dick (2002) estimates the demand for comercial bank deposits for the US for the period 1993-
1999, and ¯nds that customers respond to deposit rates and account fees in choosing a depository
institution. Customers also respond favorably to branch sta±ng, geographic density, the bank's
age, size, and geographic diversi¯cation (the number of states in which the bank operates). She
uses number of employees per branch, the age of the bank, salary per employee, and geographic
diversi¯cation as proxies for bank quality.
Adams et al. (2004) investigate the willingness of consumers to substitute banks for thrifts and
to switch between institutions with large and small branch networks. They use a panel of almost
all banks and thrifts in the US for the period 1990-2001 and construct a non-nested discrete choice
random utility model of consumer's choice of a depository institution. Their ¯ndings indicate that
deposit supply increases with own deposit rate, own branches, employees per branch and branch
density in the market. According to their ¯ndings thrifts and banks, as well as large and small
branch network banks are found to compete more directly in rural markets than in urban markets.
The factors that in°uence customers' decisions are not limited to deposit rates and bank
branches. Fry et al. (1973), by working on a survey data, ¯nd past patronage, patronage of parents,
mobility and gender, among other variables, as signi¯cant for customers' loyalty on their banks.
Especially social factors as family in°uence, personal relations with bank personnel can distort
the conditions of assumption for competitive banking, and impede monitoring risk-price mix in
decisions.
For a competitive and sound banking system monitoring and knowing customers is also an
important issue. Bozcar (1978) uses customer characteristics as age, home ownership, and credit-
card ownership, number of dependents, marital status, education, race, income and gender to mirror
the risk-taking behavior of customers.1 Using a survey data gathered in 1970 on the socio-economic
1In a slightly di®erent but related context, Apilado et al. (1974) consider similar variables including age, gender,
marital status, home ownership, length of service with current employer, gross monthly income, number of dependents,
total monthly payments, to have a checking account, and security (if any), purpose, amount and terms (number of
monthly payments) of the loan to discriminate between potentially good and bad credit customers.
3characteristics of credit users, and a probit model, he shows that the borrower pro¯les of banks and
¯nance companies di®er in terms of home ownership, credit-card ownership, age, education, and
race, although the predictive accuracy tests indicate substantial overlap in the risk characteristics
of borrowers served by the two institutions.
3 An Overview of the Turkish Banking Sector
On February 19, 2001 a row between the President and the Prime Minister triggered the most
severe ¯nancial crisis that the Turkish Republic has ever experienced. On the same day the foreign
exchange demand amounted to a total of eight billion euros. Two days later the overnight rates
reached a peak of 4,000 %, but that was still not enough to prevent the capital out°ows. The crawl-
ing peg regime, which was the basic pillar of the 1999 disin°ation program, had to be abandoned,
and within one day the Turkish currency lost around 30% of its value. A total of seven banks failed
in 2001. Although the dispute between the politicians seemed to trigger the crisis, the real cause
was the fragility of the ¯nancial system itself.2
Before the liberalization of the Turkish ¯nancial system in the 1980s, the banking sector was
highly regulated and concentrated. The only tools of competition for the banks were the scale of
branch networks and the number of their personnel. As the restrictions were removed as a part
of the liberalization program, the deposit rates became the major tool of competition rather than
branching. Smaller banks, especially, were observed to be pushing the interest rates higher. In
addition to interest rates, the ¯nancing of the government debt through issuing securities had been
another crucial factor that reduced the importance of branches. It was more pro¯table for the
banks to borrow funds from abroad and lend it to the government than collecting deposits and
lending to the real sector (Damar (2004)).
Table 3 presents the number of banks, branches and personnel between 1980-2000 in Turkey.
The has been a considerable increase in the number of banks, branches and personnel, however
banks contracted in size, as can be observed from the number of employees and branches per bank.
In the meantime, as banks functioned mainly to transfer funds to the government, their loan
portfolio deteriorated as well. The conglomerates were able to found their own banks after the
2For a detailed account of the 2001 crisis in Turkey see, for example, Alper (2001), Alper and Ä Oni» s (2004), Gencay
and Sel» cuk (2005), and Ä Ozatay and Sak (2002).
4Number Number of Number of Number of Number of
Year of banks employees branches employees/bank branches/bank
1980 43 125,312 5,954 2,914 138
1990 66 154,089 6,560 2,335 99
2000 79 170,401 7,837 2,157 99
Table 1: Number of banks, employment ¯gures and branches during 1980-2000.
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency.
liberalization due to the attractiveness of cheap loans to the ¯rms within their body. This, together
with the illegal transfer of funds to owners and executives, contributed to this deterioration (Soral
et al., 2003).
As a result of the 1994 crisis, the signi¯cant devaluation of the Turkish lira worsened the
banks' positions as they had been borrowing from abroad to lend the government. In addition,
the worsening of Turkey's credit rating made fundraising from abroad harder and more expensive.
Consequently, three banks were liquidated. To combat the crisis, the Savings Deposit Insurance
Fund (SDIF hereafter) was entitled the provision of full deposit insurance.3
The 1994 crisis and the developments in its aftermath did not provide an adequate solution to
the problems in the banking sector. The full deposit insurance distorted the incentives further. In
addition, the government was not inclined to closing these banks in fear of the consequences. Thus,
banking practices worsened. By the end of the 1990s, the banks again started a similar cycle as
they did before the 1994 crisis: borrow from abroad and invest in government securities.4
By the end of 1999, the government initiated a stabilization program with the IMF and and
the SDIF took control of ¯ve banks. In late 2000, lower con¯dence in the stabilization program,
problems with privatization, the liquidation of two more banks among other factors led to a capital
°ight which resulted in the failure of one bank in November 2000 that held government securities as a
large proportion of its portfolio and further deterioration of con¯dence in the economy. In February
2001, the dispute between the President and the Prime Minister initiated the turmoil, which is
3As it is put forth by many, full deposit insurance may have more costs than bene¯ts as it distorts the incentives.
For example, Dowd (1996) states that with deposit insurance, the depositors stop monitoring the bank management,
and managers do not worry about maintaining con¯dence anymore. He further argues that free banking, i.e. free
trade in the ¯nancial services sector without any intervention or regulation, would provide a stable system. This
argument is also supported by Selgin and White (1994) who also write that a total laissez-faire is not possible in
practice due to many costs. Finally, Beck et al. (2003) point out that crises are less likely in economies with fewer
regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and more concentration in the sector would encourage
competition and enhance stability.
4See Damar (2004); Soral et al. (2003); Denizer et al. (2000); Alper and Ä Oni» s (2004); Alper et al. (2001) for details.
5mentioned above, which resulted in the failure of two more banks due to currency mismatch (Damar,
2004).
The turmoil marked the beginning of a restructuring in the banking sector, starting with the
foundation of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), takeovers of insolvent
banks, investment banks and depository institutions. These were then grouped and merged, and
put on sale. New regulations were put in place to prevent recurrence.
4 Data
The data used in this study is gathered by SAM Research and Consulting Inc. (Istanbul, Turkey) in
2002. To ensure the representation of the target population at national level, strati¯ed multistage
random sampling method is used. Target population is de¯ned as the population older than 18
years old, having an account in one bank, and living in an area where at least one bank branch
exists. The population living in places where no bank exists is left out for operational reasons.
Region and number of banks in the residential area are used as strati¯cation criteria. The ques-
tionnaires are implemented in nine regions, 84 districts of 23 cities. Accordingly, a total of 1829
interviews are done. Fieldwork is accomplished during February 9-28, 2002. The variables used in
this study are presented below.
The Dependent Variable
The choice of main bank is classi¯ed under four distinct categories, namely
² Public banks (Halk Bank, Ziraat Bank, Vakf Bank)
² _ I» s Bank
² Large private banks (Akbank, Garanti, Yap³Kredi)
² Small private banks (all other private banks)
This categorization is done because we are speci¯cally interested in the di®erences between pub-
lic and private banks. Large private banks are kept separately from small private banks, because
they hold stronger capitals and are expected to be less risky. _ I» s Bank, which is also private, is taken
6Bank Choice Frequency Percent
Public Banks 700 38.27
_ I» s Bank 441 24.11
Large Private Banks 532 29.09
Small Private Banks 156 8.53
Total 1829 100.00











Very well 48 2.70
Total 1777 100.00
Table 2: The Distribution of Bank Choice, Culture Level and Information Level in the sample.
separately given the \public-like" perception towards the bank.5 See Table 2 for the distribution
of bank choice across the sample.
Potential Explanatory Variables
Demographics
Demographic characteristics include gender, age, education, income level, and occupation.
Education level is comprised of four dummy variables, namely no education (illiterate, literate
without degree), primary school (5-8 years), high school (11-13 years), and university (15 years or
more).
Seven dummies of income level refer to total household income corresponding to less than 175
YTL (around 120 Euros), 175 YTL - 300 YTL (around 210 Euros), 301 YTL - 500 YTL (around
5_ I» s Bank is a large private bank established in 1924 by the initiative of Ataturk, the founder of the Republic.
Ataturk provided one fourth of the bank's initial capital. The treasury had 12.3% share until 1998. The bank has
always been a private bank nad 28% of its shares are traded publicly. Another 25% are owned by the ¯rst political
party of the Republic. Among all private banks, due to this history, _ I» s Bank is perceived as semi-public.
7350 Euros), 501 YTL -750 YTL (around 520 Euros), 751 YTL - 1,000 YTL (around 700 Euros),
1,000 YTL - 1,500 YTL (around 1040 Euros), and more than 1,500 YTL.6
There are nine occupation categories.
² Manager/specialist: Manager / specialist in public or private sector / professor at university;
big trader, industry owner; professional with private practice; research assistant at university
² Civil servant (except directors/specialists/professors)
² Blue collar worker in public sector
² Blue collar worker in private sector




² Other: Irregular work at home, irregular work outside the home, house wife/girl, only living
on interest/rent income
Culture
Six questions addressing the cultural activities of the respondent include reading newspaper,
going to cinema, going to theater, going to concerts, traveling and reading books. Answers are
taken on a likert scale of four, such that \1-never", \2-very seldom", \3-sometimes", \4-regularly."
These six questions are analyzed with Principle Components Analysis (PCA) in order to char-
acterize customers' level of cultural consumption. As a result of the analysis a normalized index is
obtained. Although the variable is treated as continuous variable, the range of the variable [-1.65,
2.74] is divided into four equal sub-ranges for descriptive purpose.
Banking services
Four variables that show service usage are as follows:
² Standard banking services: Bank card, ATM, credit card
² Saving services: Deposit account, investment account
6Conversions are made using 2002 exchange rates.
8Variable Range Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 1=Female, 2= Male 1829 1.748 0.434
Age 18+ 1829 37.063 12.942
No education 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.024 0.153
Primary school 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.393 0.489
High school 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.284 0.451
University 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.299 0.458
Income 1
¤ (< 175) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.086 0.28
Income 2
¤ (175-300) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.25 0.433
Income 3
¤ (301-500) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.285 0.451
Income 4
¤ (501-750) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.179 0.383
Income 5
¤ (751-1000) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.095 0.293
Income 6
¤ (1000-1500) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.045 0.207
Income 7
¤ (> 1500) 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.027 0.163
Manager/specialist 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.036 0.187
Civil servant 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.117 0.322
Blue collar - public 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.041 0.198
Blue collar-private 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.169 0.375
Small trader 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.197 0.398
Retired 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.169 0.375
Student 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.095 0.293
Unemployed 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.062 0.242
Other Employment 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.113 0.317
Culture Index variable in range [-1.65, 2.74] 1820 0 1
Stand
¤¤ 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.846 0.361
Save
¤¤ 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.426 0.495
Credit
¤¤ 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.126 0.332
Tech
¤¤ 1=Use, 0=Not use 1829 0.128 0.334
Info Index variable in range [-1.54, 3.22] 1777 0 1
Table 3: Data Summary 1. Demographics in the sample.
¤ Quoted in terms of new Turkish liras (YTL)
¤¤ Stand: use of standard services, Save: use of saving services, Credit: use of credit services, Tech: use of technology
services.
² Credit services: Credit deposit account, commercial credit, consumer loan, housing loan
² Technology services: Automatic bill payment, telephone banking, internet banking, banking
via TV, banking via WAP, POS machine
Customers' level of knowledge about banking services is also questioned. The services asked
are namely ATM, credit card, bank card, teller machine (included separately for the ones who are
not familiar with the ATM abbreviation), telephone banking, internet banking, banking via TV,
banking via WAP, POS machine. Their knowledge is rated on a scale of 1 to 5 such that \1" means
know nothing, \5" means know very well.
These nine questions are used to obtain a general information level (index) on banking services.
This is accomplished by PCA. This variable is also treated as a continuous variable as in the case
9of culture. However, the range of the variable [-1.54, 3.22] is divided into ¯ve equal sub-ranges for
descriptive purpose.
Table 3 provides the summary of demographic factors, culture and information variables across
the sample.
Important factors in banking
Respondents are also asked directly about the factors that in°uence their bank choice. These
factors are namely
1. Past patronage of other family members
2. Having special services for farmers
3. Having full range of services that are needed
4. Having the best telephone banking service
5. Having the best internet banking service
6. Having special services for craftsmen
7. The bank where salary/pension is deposited
8. Being a state bank
9. Having close branches to home / work place / school
10. Having the most appropriate terms of credit
11. Having the highest interest rates for deposit
12. Being the most trustworthy bank
13. Having friendly sta®
14. One-to-one relationship with bank manager/customer representative
The most important factors appear to be the bank where salary or pension is deposited, being
trustable, closeness of bank's branches and having full range of services.
The respondents are also asked about their level of trust to the banking system in general. A
likert scale of one to ¯ve is used, where 1 means \I do not trust at all" and ¯ve means \I trust a
lot."
10Variable Range Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Salary/pension 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.32 0.467
Trust bank 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.231 0.421
Closeness 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.221 0.415
Full service 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.201 0.401
Sta® 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.186 0.389
Family 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.176 0.381
State 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.172 0.377
Manager 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.087 0.282
Terms of credit 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.06 0.237
Services for craftsmen 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.049 0.215
Interest rates 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.047 0.212
Telephone banking 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.037 0.189
Internet 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.036 0.187
Services for farmers 1= Yes, 0= No 1829 0.02 0.139
Trust sector [1-5]: 1=Not at all, 5=A lot 1651 2.462 1.083
Table 4: Data Summary 2.
The summary of these variables across the whole sample is presented in Table 4.
Region and branch density
Dummy variables are constructed to account for possible regional di®erences. Nine dummies
indicate Mediterranean, Aegean, Southeast Anatolia, Black Sea, Northeast Anatolia, Marmara,
Central Eastern Anatolia, Central South Anatolia, and Central North Eastern Anatolia regions.
Moreover, there are ¯ve dummy variables which show the branch density according to the
number of branches in the residential area. The categories are having 1-2, 3-5, 6-9, more than ten
branches (excluding metropolitan areas), and metropolitan areas.
5 Econometric Framework and Estimation Results
A standard multinomial choice model is constructed by introducing the entire set of potential
explanatory variables at once The model is estimated via multinomial logit technique.7 The in-
signi¯cant variables are eliminated iteratively until attaining a parsimonious result. However, trust
in the banking sector in general is kept as a control variable despite its insigni¯cance. The signi¯-
cance of variables is also tested with likelihood-ratio tests. The estimation output is presented in
7Due to missing cases in explanatory variables, the model is run on 1643 observations, dropping the missing values.
11the appendix.
Demographics
The results show that as age increases the probability of choosing _ I» s Bank rather than public
banks decreases. Large and small private banks are no di®erent than _ I» s Bank in that sense. This
might have been interpreted as the e®ect of retirees since they receive their pension from public
banks; however the e®ects of salary/pension and being retired are already controlled separately
with two other variables. Therefore this result can simply be attributed to the decision that the
elderly took in the past; keeping _ I» s Bank aside the prevalence of private banks in the Turkish
banking sector is relatively new. Although it seems to be mostly related with habituation, this
attitude might also be attributed to a less risk taking behavior of the elderly. On the other hand,
it is interesting to see that the di®erence among private banks (including _ I» s Bank) with respect to
age is not signi¯cant.
It is notable that none of the education levels, except university degree, appears signi¯cant.
University degree is signi¯cant for small private banks at 5% level; public banks' customers are
around two times more likely to have a university degree or higher compared to small banks'
customers. Small private banks' customers are also less likely to have a university degree compared
to _ I» s Bank's and large private banks' customers.
Culture is only signi¯cant, at 10% level, for the case of large private banks versus public banks;
the cultural consumption level of large private banks' customers is higher than that of public banks'
customers.
As expected, public banks are quite dominant among retired people. It is interesting to see
that neither age nor receiving pension, as control variables, eliminates the signi¯cance of the e®ect
of being retired. An _ I» s Bank customer is 80% less likely to be retired. Similarly, customers of large
private banks and small private banks are 75% and 72% less likely to be retired compared to public
banks' customers.
Public banks, unexpectedly, are not dominant at all among civil servants. On the contrary, _ I» s
Bank's and small private banks' customers are around 2.5 times more likely to be civil servants
compared to public banks' customers. Large private banks are comparatively less accomplished
12among civil servants, however still 1.7 times more likely than public banks (signi¯cant at 10%
level). This shows that without salary e®ect, private banks attract civil servants much more than
public banks. It is known that some public institutions, e.g. schools or universities, engage in
agreements with private banks for salaries in exchange of discounts, special services or lump sum
cash paid to the institution by the bank. That might also be an explanation to how private banks
can be that in°uential on civil servants. Another signi¯cant result is that civil servants prefer _ I» s
Bank around 2.5 more likely compared to large private banks.
Private banks are even stronger in reaching the blue collars in the public sector compared to
public banks. Similarly, blue collars in private sector prefer private banks more than public banks.
However, the di®erence among other private banks, including _ I» s Bank, is not signi¯cant for workers.
Students, on the other hand, are more than half times less likely to work with private banks,
including _ I» s Bank, compared to public banks. This might be attributed to the distribution of public
funds and scholarships for students through public banks.
The e®ect of receiving salary or pension payments is obviously signi¯cant (at 1% level). A
customer receiving her salary/pension payment from her main bank happens to be 55% less likely
to be an _ I» s Bank customer, and around 70% less likely to be a customer of other private banks
compared with public banks.
Services used
The e®ect of services in bank choice is signi¯cant. Public banks seem to fall behind private
banks in technology services. The customers of _ I» s Bank, large private banks and small private banks
are on average three to four times as likely to use technology services compared to public banks'
customers. On the other hand, Is Bank and other private banks appear to be even in technology
services in the eye of customers.
_ I» s Bank's customers are around half times less likely to use credit services compared to public
banks. Using credit services is not a signi¯cant criterion for the choice of other private banks com-
pared to public banks. In contrast, large and small private banks are 1.7 and 1.8 times more likely
to attract credit service users than _ I» s Bank. These are actually indicators of higher selectiveness of
_ I» s Bank in their credit services.
13_ I» s Bank's and large private banks' customers are more likely to use standard services compared
to public bank customers. Since standard services include using bank card, ATM, credit cards, we
can say that _ I» s Bank and large private banks' customers display a slight sophistication compared
to public banks' customers. These banks also seem to be ahead of small private banks in standard
services usage.
_ I» s Bank is chosen around two times more likely for its full range of products/services compared
to public banks. However, the di®erence between other private banks and public banks is not
signi¯cant in that regard.
Trust
Trust in the banking sector in general does not a®ect the decision between these banks. On the
other hand, it matters whether people speci¯cally trust their main banks.
Compared to other banks' customers, _ I» s Bank's customers value trust in their main bank most;
they are 2.4, 1.4 and 3.5 times more likely to choose their main bank due to trust as compared to
public banks, large and small private banks respectively. On the other hand, large private banks'
customers are 1.7 times more likely to value trust compared to public banks' customers, and 2.4
times more likely than small private banks' customers. The di®erence between public banks and
small private banks is not signi¯cant.
These results are especially interesting, because the state backed up public banks would have
been expected to be more trustworthy. However, the results do not indicate so. Another noteworthy
issue is that the favorable state e®ect (in terms of trust) on public banks' customers compared to
private banks is more than that to _ I» s Bank which might be taken as an indicator of _ I» s Bank being
perceived as having "the state behind" as do public banks, although to a lesser extent. This e®ect
appears to be signi¯cant in the choice of _ I» s Bank rather than other private banks. It is actually in
line with the known fact that _ I» s Bank is perceived as partly public due to its past, as explained in
section two.
Prices, branches, personnel and other e®ects
14It is notable that deposit interest rates only play a role in the choice of small private banks
compared to other banks. Small private banks' customers are around four times more likely to
be in°uenced by interest rates o®ered by their bank compared to the customers of public banks
or _ I» s Bank. Similarly, large private banks' customers compared to small private banks' customers
are around three times less likely to choose their main bank due to high deposit rates. This is a
clear indication of small banks' aggressive marketing strategy through high interest rates during
the period.8 Despite the fact that small banks are not selected on the basis of trust as do other
banks, their customers' search for high interest rates indicate risky choice, if not unconscious.
The closeness of bank branches is not signi¯cant in the choice of public banks versus private
banks, including _ I» s Bank. However, compared to _ I» s Bank, small private banks are less likely to be
selected because of this factor. This result is an evidence against the idea that most people are
forced to choose public banks because most public banks, especially Ziraat Bank, have branches in
rural areas while many private banks do not.
To ¯nd friendly sta® in the bank is a factor for the choice of large private banks compared
to public banks or _ I» s Bank. Large private banks' customers are two times more likely to select
their banks because of the sta® compared to public banks' customers, and they are 1.7 times more
likely compared to _ I» s Bank's customers. This might refer to a similar customer relation approach
in public banks and _ I» s Bank. On the other hand the di®erence between small banks and _ I» s Bank
or public banks is nor signi¯cant either.
To have a one-to-one relationship with the manager or customer representative in the branch is
a signi¯cant factor in decision between public banks and small private banks; small private around
3 times more likely. Compared to _ I» s Bank, large private banks' customers are two times, small
private banks' customers are four times more likely to value manager or customer representatives.
On the other hand, small private banks' customers are two times more likely to value such a
relationship compared to the customers of large private banks. This might refer to more intensive
customer relations by private banks, especially in smaller ones, or even to informal relations in
these institutions.
Family in°uence in banking choice is also controlled for. However, the only signi¯cant relation
appears between _ I» s Bank and small private banks, _ I» s Bank's customers are around twice more likely
8For a very long time, one of the small banks (i.e. Imar Bank) kept emphasizing in their advertisements that they
had the highest interest rates.
15to be working with the bank of their parents compared to small private banks. The family in°uence
in other cases seems not to di®er signi¯cantly.
Regions and branch density
The regions that enter the model signi¯cantly are Mediterranean, Aegean, Black Sea, Marmara,
and Middle-south regions, which can be considered as somewhat developed regions of Turkey.
Private banks, including _ I» s Bank, are more dominant than public banks in all regions, when
signi¯cant. Speci¯cally in Mediterranean region small banks are more than three times more likely
to be selected compared to public banks. In Marmara region large and private banks are four times
more likely to be selected again compared to public banks.
In Mediterranean and Marmara regions small private banks are more dominant than _ I» s Bank.
Large private banks are also more dominant compared to _ I» s Bank in Marmara, and they are so in
Black Sea region as well. The regional e®ect on the choice between large and small private banks
is not signi¯cant.
We also consider the e®ect of branch density of the customers on their choices. The signi¯cant
cases are 1-2 banks, 3-5 banks and 6-9 banks. The results show that public banks are more dominant
in smaller settlements which are in line with the argument that as not many private banks have
branches in most of the rural areas, small towns around Anatolia, people living there have to
choose public banks. Compared to _ I» s Bank and small private banks, public banks are signi¯cantly
more dominant in places where there are 1-2 banks and 6-9 banks. On the other hand they are
signi¯cantly ahead of large private banks in all three cases.
In settlements with 1-2 banks, large and small private banks are more dominant than _ I» s Bank.
In contrast, _ I» s Bank is more dominant than large private banks in areas with 6-9 banks, and more
dominant than small privates in areas with 6-9 banks. Large private banks are around two times
more dominant than small private banks in areas with 3-5 banks. On the contrary, they are around
80% less dominant in areas with 6-9 banks.
166 Conclusion
Recent history shows that the banking system has a®ected the Turkish economy drastically at
times. Eleven banks failed during 1997 and 2000 period, which created unrest to its customers and
to the overall economy as well. Therefore the need for monitoring both the banks and its customers
for proper conduct and behavior has been understood. The literature on issues as bank regulation
and safe banking is vast, however that on the perspective of the bank customers is limited. In this
study, we do not search for policy implications, but rather analyze the banking choices of customers
and try to see their di®erences in terms of their characteristics and motivations. We question if
they are really rational in their choices. For that purpose, we use a unique micro-level data set on
households for 2002, one year after one of the biggest ¯nancial crisis in Turkey has faced.
The bank choice appears to be in°uenced by many factors. Main ¯ndings can be summarized
as follows:
² Customers of public banks and private banks di®er in terms of age, education and culture.
² The majority of the customers are not informed properly about the baking services in general.
Furthermore the information level of the customers is not signi¯cant in our model, implying
that the customers of all banks are equally uninformed.
² Respondents with speci¯c occupations (e.g. civil servants, blue collars) appear to di®er in
their bank choice.
² Receiving one's salary/pension payments through a bank is an obvious factor in main bank
selection.
² Closeness of branches and branch density of banks are also in°uential.
² An expected-to-be in°uential social factor, family e®ect, does not make a di®erence between
public or private banks. On the other hand, we see that around one ¯fth of the sample choose
the main bank of their parents.
² Other social factors that shape customers' choices are friendly sta® and one-to-one relationship
with bank manager or customer representative. Although the ¯rst one might sound as a
17component of service quality, especially the latter gives the sign of informal relationship in
retail banking.
² Only ¯ve percent of the sample gives importance to deposit interest rates, nevertheless this
appears to be signi¯cant especially in the choice of small private banks.
² Small private banks are less likely to be selected on the basis of trust, which re°ect the risky
behavior of the customers who search high interest rates.
² _ I» s Bank customers are less likely to use credit services. This might be taken as an indication
of the selectiveness of the bank when giving credit. Note that banks' evaluation of customers
is a further constraint that prevents independent choice of customers in loan decisions.
It is clear that banking sector is not as simple that it would function properly with simple
market rules. Its complicated dynamics may easily outweigh the price-bene¯t tradeo®. Structural
conditions, social factors are in°uential. Perceptions can easily o®set the reality. It may not be wise
to say that the decisions of the failed banks' customers are irrational; they have to be evaluated
under given conditions. However, it is possible to say that the system and the conditions are not
proper enough to support e±cient behavior.
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20Appendix - Model Output
Multinomial Logit Results with Public Banks as the Base Category
# of obs=1643  LRchi2 (87)=1428.38  Prob > chi2=0.000  Mlogit stats. 
Log likelih. =-1563.492  Pseudo R2 =0.314   
IS BANK  LARGE PRIVATE  SMALL PRIVATE  Variables 
RRR   Std. Error  RRR   Std. Error  RRR    Std. Error 
Age  0.972 *  0.006  0.971 *  0.006  0.964  *  0.008 
University  0.937   0.200  1.044   0.225  0.522  **  0.159 
Culture  1.108   0.108  1.197 ***  0.118  1.057    0.137 
Retired  0.204 *  0.070  0.247 *  0.078  0.281  *  0.126 
Civil servant  2.672 *  0.723  1.657 ***  0.492  2.426  **  0.950 
Blue collar-pub.  3.017 *  1.208  2.719 **  1.170  2.792  ***  1.509 
Blue collar-pr.  2.417 *  0.572  2.512 *  0.599  1.676  ***  0.511 
Student  0.487 **  0.147  0.375 *  0.117  0.244  *  0.130 
Tech  3.009 *  0.893  3.810 *  1.118  3.767  *  1.354 
Credit  0.545 **  0.140  0.904   0.221  1.009    0.309 
Stand  1.877 *  0.392  1.763 **  0.386  1.062    0.296 
Family  1.347   0.273  1.069   0.226  0.778    0.228 
Closeness  1.203   0.228  0.940   0.185  0.705    0.188 
Service  2.104 *  0.471  2.351 *  0.529  2.023  **  0.579 
Salary/pension  0.445 *  0.094  0.316 *  0.070  0.276  *  0.084 
State  0.174 *  0.037  0.040 *  0.012  0.041  *  0.020 
Int. Rate  0.972   0.379  1.212   0.471  3.742  *  1.530 
Trust_sector  1.060   0.072  1.087   0.077  1.119    0.105 
Turst_bank  2.414 *  0.496  1.695 **  0.365  0.690    0.213 
Staff  1.232   0.300  2.095 *  0.503  1.560    0.488 
Manager  0.723   0.266  1.449   0.494  2.933  *  1.184 
Mediterranean  1.789 **  0.493  2.262 *  0.640  3.283  *  1.202 
Aegean  2.424 *  0.592  1.950 **  0.529  1.661    0.623 
Black Sea  1.140   0.359  2.133 **  0.687  0.894    0.484 
Marmara  1.897 *  0.431  4.620 *  1.053  4.003  *  1.219 
Middle-south  1.708 ***  0.506  1.091   0.395  2.321  ***  1.045 
1-2 bank  0.163 *  0.048  0.274 *  0.073  0.348  *  0.120 
3-5 bank  1.174   0.275  0.293 *  0.096  0.641    0.251 
6-9 bank  0.602 ***  0.161  0.554 **  0.158  0.119  *  0.076 
Comparison group: Public banks    RRR: Relative Risk Ratio 
* Significant at 1% level  **: Significant at 5% level  **: Significant at 10% level 
21Multinomial Logit Results with _ I» s Bank as the Base Category
# of obs=1643  LRchi2 (87)= 1428.38  Prob > chi2=0.000  Mlogit stats. 
Log likelih. =-1563.492  Pseudo R2 =0.314   
PUBLIC BANKS  LARGE PRIVATE  SMALL PRIVATE  Variables 
RRR    Std. Error  RRR   Std. Error  RRR    Std. Error 
Age  1.029  *  0.007  1.000   0.007  0.993    0.009 
University  1.068    0.228  1.114   0.210  0.558  **  0.161 
Culture  0.902    0.088  1.080   0.095  0.954    0.118 
Retired  4.893  *  1.670  1.207   0.472  1.373    0.697 
Civil servant  0.374  *  0.101  0.620 ***  0.164  0.908    0.338 
Blue collar-pub.  0.332  *  0.133  0.901   0.320  0.926    0.452 
Blue collar-pr.  0.414  *  0.098  1.039   0.195  0.694    0.189 
Student  2.052  **  0.619  0.770   0.218  0.501    0.261 
Tech  0.332  *  0.099  1.266   0.254  1.252    0.366 
Credit  1.833  **  0.472  1.658 **  0.399  1.850  **  0.569 
Stand  0.533  *  0.111  0.939   0.207  0.566  **  0.161 
Family  0.742    0.150  0.793   0.143  0.577  **  0.159 
Closeness  0.831    0.158  0.782   0.132  0.586  **  0.147 
Service  0.475  *  0.107  1.118   0.199  0.961    0.246 
Salary/pension  2.248  *  0.473  0.710   0.150  0.621    0.186 
State  5.739  *  1.220  0.231 *  0.071  0.233  *  0.116 
Int. Rate  1.029    0.402  1.248   0.468  3.851  *  1.564 
Trust_sector  0.943    0.064  1.025   0.068  1.056    0.097 
Turst_bank  0.414  *  0.085  0.702 **  0.122  0.286  *  0.081 
Staff  0.811    0.198  1.700 *  0.338  1.266    0.365 
Manager  1.383    0.509  2.004 **  0.564  4.057  *  1.476 
Mediterranean  0.559  **  0.154  1.264   0.319  1.835  ***  0.642 
Aegean  0.413  *  0.101  0.804   0.194  0.685    0.247 
Black Sea  0.877    0.276  1.870 ***  0.619  0.784    0.434 
Marmara  0.527  *  0.120  2.435 *  0.502  2.110  **  0.620 
Middle-south  0.586  ***  0.174  0.639   0.227  1.359    0.612 
1-2 bank  6.121  *  1.812  1.677 ***  0.503  2.129  **  0.807 
3-5 bank  0.852    0.200  0.249 *  0.075  0.546    0.205 
6-9 bank  1.662  ***  0.445  0.921   0.251  0.198  **  0.127 
Comparison group: Is Bank    RRR: Relative Risk Ratio 
* Significant at 1% level  **: Significant at 5% level  **: Significant at 10% level 
22Multinomial Logit Results with Large Private Banks as the Base Category
# of obs=1643  LRchi2 (87)= 1428.38  Prob > chi2=0.000  Mlogit stats. 
Log likelih. =-1563.492  Pseudo R2 =0.314   
PUBLIC BANKS  IS BANK  SMALL PRIVATE  Variables 
RRR    Std. Error  RRR   Std. Error  RRR    Std. Error 
Age  1.030  *  0.007  1.000   0.007 0.993    0.009 
University  0.958    0.207  0.897   0.169 0.500  **  0.138 
Culture  0.836  ***  0.082  0.926   0.082 0.884    0.105 
Retired  4.053  *  1.282  0.828   0.324 1.137    0.536 
Civil servant  0.603  ***  0.179  1.612 ***  0.427 1.464    0.546 
Blue collar-pub.  0.368  **  0.158  1.109   0.394 1.027    0.498 
Blue collar-pr.  0.398  *  0.095  0.962   0.180 0.667    0.173 
Student  2.665  *  0.832  1.299   0.367 0.651    0.334 
Tech  0.262  *  0.077  0.790   0.159 0.989    0.268 
Credit  1.106    0.270  0.603 **  0.145 1.116    0.305 
Stand  0.567  **  0.124  1.065   0.234 0.603  ***  0.168 
Family  0.936    0.198  1.261   0.227 0.728    0.194 
Closeness  1.063    0.210  1.279   0.217 0.749    0.182 
Service  0.425  *  0.096  0.895   0.159 0.860    0.207 
Salary/pension  3.167  *  0.699  1.409   0.297 0.874    0.258 
State  24.856  *  7.519  4.331 *  1.324 1.007    0.534 
Int. Rate  0.825    0.321  0.802   0.301 3.087  *  1.123 
Trust_sector  0.920    0.065  0.976   0.065 1.030    0.092 
Turst_bank  0.590  **  0.127  1.424 **  0.248 0.407  *  0.112 
Staff  0.477  *  0.115  0.588 *  0.117 0.744    0.199 
Manager  0.690    0.235  0.499 **  0.140 2.024  **  0.626 
Mediterranean  0.442  *  0.125  0.791   0.199 1.452    0.496 
Aegean  0.513  **  0.139  1.243   0.299 0.852    0.316 
Black Sea  0.469  **  0.151  0.535 ***  0.177 0.419    0.229 
Marmara  0.216  *  0.049  0.411 *  0.085 0.866    0.245 
Middle-south  0.916    0.332  1.565   0.556 2.127    1.024 
1-2 bank  3.650  *  0.977  0.596 ***  0.179 1.270    0.438 
3-5 bank  3.416  *  1.120  4.010 *  1.205 2.191  ***  0.939 
6-9 bank  1.805  **  0.515  1.086   0.296 0.215  **  0.137 
Comparison group: Large pr.    RRR: Relative Risk Ratio 
* Significant at 1% level  **: Significant at 5% level  **: Significant at 10% level 
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